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Abstract  
IP telephony refers to the use of Internet protocols to provide voice, video, and data in one 
integrated service over LANs, BNs, MANs, not WANs. VoIP provides three key benefits 
compared to traditional voice telephone services. First, it minimizes the need fro extra wiring 
in new buildings. Second, it provides easy movement of telephones and the ability of phone 
numbers to move with the individual. Finally, VoIP is generally cheaper to operate because it 
requires less network capacity to transmit the same voice telephone call over an increasingly 
digital telephone network (FitzGerald & Dennis, 2007 p. 519). Unfortunately, benefits of 
new electronic communications come with proportionate risks. Companies experience losses 
resulting from attacks on data networks. There are direct losses like economic theft, theft of 
trade secrets and digital data, as well as indirect losses that include loss of sales, loss of 
competitive advantage etc. The companies need to develop their security policies to protect 
their businesses. But the practice of information security has become more complex than 
ever. The research paper will be about the major DoS threats the company’s VoIP 
environment can experience as well as best countermeasures that can be used to prevent them 
and make the VoIP environment and, therefore, company’s networking environment more 
secure. 
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Introduction 
 
Background 
Voice over IP (VoIP) is one of the newest technologies that is being rapidly embraced 
by the market as an alternative to the traditional public switched telephone network (PSTN). 
VoIP is a broad term, describing many different types of applications – for example, hard 
phones, softphones, proxy servers, Instant Messaging clients, peer-to-peer clients. They are 
installed on a wide variety of platforms – Linux, Windows, mobile devices. These 
applications use a wide variety of proprietary and open protocols that depend heavily on the 
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preexisting data network’s infrastructure and services. Therefore, VoIP security is as broad a 
subject as a number of devices and applications used in the VoIP environment in 
organizations. The current research paper is dedicated to VoIP security which becomes more 
important and more relevant nowadays. It is well known that the benefit of electronic 
communication come with proportionate risks. Critical business systems can be and are 
compromised regularly, and are used for illegal purposes. These systems constantly 
experience attacks that can cause substantial losses. 
The following table describes losses that a company can experience from attacks on 
data networks (Porter, 2006, p. 3): 
Table 1 Losses Resulting from Attacks on Data Networks 
Direct Losses Indirect Losses 
Economic theft Loss of sales 
Theft of trade secrets Loss of competitive advantage 
Theft of digital assets Brand damage 
Theft of consumer data Loss of goodwill 
Theft of computing resources Failure to meet contract obligations 
Productivity loss due to data corruption Noncompliance with privacy regulations 
Productivity loss due to spam Officer liability 
Recovery expenses  Reparations  
 
As we can see from the table the company simply can go bankrupt and default. 
Partially it can happen if the company doesn’t have secure VoIP environment. 
 
The following table describes the general levels of that can be attacked in a VoIP 
infrastructure (Porter, 2006, p. 240). 
Table 2VoIP Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability Description 
IP infrastructure  
 
Vulnerabilities on related non-VoIP 
systems can lead to compromise of VoIP 
infrastructure.  
Underlying operating system  VoIP devices inherit the same 
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 vulnerabilities as the operating system or 
firmware they run on. Operating systems 
are Windows and Linux.  
Configuration In their default configuration most VoIP 
devices ship with a surfeit of open 
services. The default services running on 
the open ports may be vulnerable to DoS 
attacks, buffer overflows, or 
authentication bypass.  
Application level Immature technologies can be attacked to 
disrupt or manipulate service. Legacy 
applications (DNS, for example) have 
known problems. 
 
According to Orans (2005), the common VoIP threats are network-based denial of 
service (DoS), eavesdropping, and signaling protocols. DoS attacks are especially 
problematic in a VoIP environment, because the network congestion that they introduce can 
make conversations unintelligible. In LANs and WANs, the threat can be mitigated by 
creating a separate virtual LAN for voice traffic and protecting it (via bandwidth reservation, 
for example) from malicious traffic that could overrun it. VoIP over the Internet remains a 
riskier proposition, due to the lack of QoS in Internet backbone networks (p. 2).  
Another threat that is very has received a lot of attention due to the understandable 
fear that malicious people can listen in on our conversations is eavesdropping. Packet 
capturing, or "eavesdropping," is technically an issue within LANs, WANs and the Internet, 
although this risk is generally overhyped. The same eavesdropping techniques apply whether 
the intent is to capture data packets or voice ones. Therefore, the same precautions that 
organizations implement to protect data traffic against eavesdropping also apply to voice 
traffic (Orans, 2006, p. 2). 
Signaling Protocols are also one of the threats to VoIP. These are used to establish 
communication sessions between two or more endpoints. Among the standards-based 
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protocols, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is becoming the most widely deployed solution. 
Orans (2006) argues that it is a relatively new protocol, and is just beginning to receive the 
detailed security analysis and scrutiny that will enhance its resistance to attack. Other 
signaling standards are H.323 and MGCP. SIP's versatility enables it to establish 
communications over LANs, WANs and the Internet, therefore presenting common risks in 
all environments (p. 2). 
In the current paper we will consider DoS and DDoS attacks that are very problematic 
for the company. The paper pursues the goal to investigate different types of DoS and DDoS 
attacks and countermeasures that can be effectively used by the companies to ensure business 
continuity. 
 
Objectives of Study 
As was mentioned above, the common VoIP threats are network-based denial of 
service (DoS), eavesdropping, and signaling protocols. While such threats as eavesdropping 
and signaling protocols are important for a company to prevent, the most problematic is the 
denial of service attacks that are difficult to control. The objectives of the study is investigate 
what types of DoS/DDoS attacks a company can experience, what effective countermeasures 
can be implemented to prevent such attacks to ensure business continuity of the company, 
and give the management suggestions on the best practices of managing secure VoIP 
environment.  
Problem Statement 
The problem statement is as follows: investigate different types of DoS/DDoS 
attacks, malicious scenarios that can be implemented against a company’s VoIP environment 
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and efficient countermeasures that a company can implement to secure its VoIP and 
networking environment. 
Research Questions 
The research questions of the study are as follows: 
- What are the types and malicious scenarios of DoS and DDoS that are the 
most problematic to the companies? 
- What are the best countermeasures and solutions that a company and 
management should implement to secure it VoIP and networking 
environment? 
These questions are important since they can generate and develop a knowledge base 
of a company for developing and improving business continuity plan and disaster recovery 
plan. 
Scope of Study 
This study only looks at DoS and DDoS attacks the company can experience, 
investigation of possible malicious scenarios and countermeasures that can be implemented 
against these attacks. 
Definition of Terms 
Definition and abbreviations of the terms used in the text is presented below. 
ACL  -  Access Control Lists  
ALG - Application layer gateway 
AP - Access point 
ARP   -   Address resolution Protocol is used to resolve the hardware address of a 
card to package the Ethernet data. It works at the data link layer  
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AS—Application server 
ATM - Asynchronous transfer mode 
Backbone  -  Main cable used to connect computers on a network.  
Bandwidth  -  Indicates the amount of data that can be sent in a time period.  
Botnet  -  networks of software agents that often lie dormant until triggered to create 
harm, typically through DoS 
Broadband  -  Uses analog signals to divide the cable into several channels with each 
channel at its own frequency. Each channel can only transmit one direction.  
CCF - Charging collection function 
CVE  -  Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
DDoS  -  Distributed denial of service  
DHCP  -  Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol is used to assign IP addresses 
dynamically to network cards works at the application layer.  
DMZ - Demilitarized zone 
DNS  -  Domain Name System is used on the internet to correlate between IP address 
and readable names.  
DNS - Domain name system 
DoS  -  Denial - of - service  
DSCP  -  Differentiated Services Code Point  
DSL - Digital subscriber line 
EAP - Extensible Authentication Protocol 
ESP - Encapsulating Security Protocol 
188______________________________________________________________ iJAMT 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
The International Journal of Applied Management and Technology, Vol 6, Num 1 
Ethernet  -  A network architecture that uses carrier - sense multiple - access with 
collision detection (CSMA/CD) for controlling access to the network media and baseband 
broadcasts. It uses star topology.  
FTP - File Transfer Protocol 
Gateway  -  A gateway can translate information between different network data 
formats or network architectures. It can translate TCP/IP to AppleTalk so computers 
supporting TCP/IP can communicate with Apple brand computers. Not the same as a default 
gateway used by a client to send packets to.  
HTTP - Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS - Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
IAD - Internet access device 
IBCF - Interconnect border control function 
ICMP  -  Internet Control Message Protocol is used to perform network error 
reporting and status. It works at the transport layer.  
I - CSCF—Interrogating CSCF 
IDS - Intrusion detection system 
IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKE - Internet key exchange 
IMS - IP Multimedia Subsystem 
InterNIC  -  Internet Network Information Center, the authority for allocating internet 
addresses.  
IP  -  Internet Protocol is used for software addressing of computers and works at the 
data link layer 
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IPS  -  Intrusion Prevention System  
IPSec  -  Internet protocol security, developed by IETF, implemented at layer 3.  
IPS - Intrusion prevention system 
IPX  -  Internetwork Packet Exchange supports the transport and network layers of 
the OSI network model.  
ISDN  -  Integrated Services Digital Network is a method of sending voice and data 
information on a digital phone line. Two 64Kbps B - channels with one 16Kbps D channel is 
provided with basic ISDN service  
ISS - Internet Security Systems 
ISUP - Integrated services digital network user 
LAN - Local Area Network  
MAC - Media Access Control address. Basically a network card unique hardware 
address.  
MAN -  Metropolitan area network refers to a network which connects several  
NAT - Network address translation 
NIC  -  Network interface card. Also called LAN adapters.  
NIPS – Network - based Intrusion Prevention Systems  
OSI  -  Open Systems Interconnect PBX – Private Branch Exchange 
PCM  -  pulse code modulation  
Protocol  -  A set of standards sets of standards that define all operations within a 
network. There are various protocols that operate at various levels of the OSI network model 
such as transport protocols include TCP, SPX.  
PSK - Preshared key 
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PSTN - Public switched telephone network 
QoS - Quality of service 
Router  -  Routes data packets between two networks.  
RTP - Real Time Transport Protocol 
SA - Security association 
SBC - Session border controller 
SDP - Session Description Protocol 
Sector 
SG - Security gateway 
SIP – Session Initiation Protocol 
SMS - Short message service 
SNMP - Simple Network Management 
SRTP - Secure RTP 
SSH - Secure shell 
SSID - Service set identifier 
SSL - Secure Sockets Layer 
TLS - Transport Layer Security 
TTLS - Tunneled transport layer security 
UDP - User Datagram Protocol 
VLAN – Virtual LAN 
VoIP - Voice over IP 
VPN  -  Virtual Private Networking.  
WAN  -  Wide Area Network  
IJAMT   191 
 
The International Journal of Applied Management and Technology, Vol 6, Num 1 
WEP - Wired equivalent privacy 
Wi – Fi - Wireless fidelity 
WLAN - Wireless local area network 
WPA - Wi - Fi protected access 
Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter it was shown that for business continuity of any company, it is 
important to maintain secure VoIP and networking environment. The common VoIP threats 
are network-based denial of service, eavesdropping, and signaling protocols. A company 
should develop, maintain and improve its strategies against malicious attacks. The company 
should know how these attacks can be organized, possible attack scenarios and effective 
countermeasures that can prevent these attacks. The study of such attacks and 
countermeasures are narrowed to DoS and DDoS attacks. The objectives of the study is 
investigate what types of DoS/DDoS attacks a company can experience, what effective 
countermeasures can be implemented to prevent such attacks to ensure business continuity of 
the company, and give the management suggestions on the best practices of managing secure 
VoIP environment.  
Review of Literature 
There is a lot of literature available that describe threats to the VoIP and networking 
environment of the company – from introductory description of attacks and threats to very 
detailed and technical analysis of them. It is worth mentioning the works of FitzGerald & 
Dennis (2007) where VoIP technology is described, Davidson et al. (2007) which provides 
fundamentals of VoIP technology and provides more detailed description of VoIP technology 
and overview of typical security requirements in the context of VoIP services (pp. 221 – 
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236).  Porter (2006) and Endler & Collier (2007) provide detailed description of possible 
attacks, hacks and threats VoIP environment can experience. They provide detailed 
explanation of denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and 
countermeasures that can be effective in preventing such attacks (Porter 2006, pp. 240-248; 
Endler & Collier, 2007, pp. 121-147). Both books describe possible DoS/DDoS attacks, how 
these attack are organized, what kind of harm such attacks can bring and countermeasures 
that should be implemented in order to prevent these attacks. The information provided in 
these books will be analyzed in Chapter 4. Also, there are many interesting peer-reviewed 
papers that discuss DoS/DDoS attacks and measures for preventing them.  
Peng et al. (2007) presented an extensive survey of denial of service attacks and the 
methods that have been proposed for defense against these attacks. In this survey, the authors 
analyzed the design decisions in the Internet that have created the potential for denial of 
service attacks. They review the state-of-art mechanisms for defending against denial of 
service attacks, compared the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal, and discussed 
potential countermeasures against each defense mechanism. The authors think that integrated 
approach can be used in solving the problem of distributed DoS. They note that DoS attack 
generally achieve their goal by sending large volumes of packets that occupy a significant 
proportion of the available bandwidth. Hence, DoS attacks are also bandwidth attacks. The 
aim of a bandwidth attack is to consume critical resources of in a network service. Possible 
target resources may include CPU capacity in a server, stack space in network protocol 
software, or Internet link capacity. By exhausting these critical resources, the attacker can 
prevent legitimate users from accessing the service (p. 4). 
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Kurapati (2007) argues that Voice over IP (VoIP) is vulnerable like any application 
on the Internet, since the IP network can easily be used to launch malicious attacks and cause 
service abuse. VoIP networks have thousands of unique vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
to launch a variety of attacks. These include deliberate application-specific assaults against 
the VoIP infrastructure, such as denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks. Even more disruptive are unique service abuses that target end-users, such 
as stealth attacks and VoIP spam. Companies and organizations need to be aware of and 
effectively protect their network from these attacks against their infrastructure and the 
additional ones against end-users, which are unique to IP communications applications. 
These application-specific threats are in addition to attacks, such as call hijacking, fraud and 
eavesdropping, that are using encryption and authentication. 
One of the interesting articles is the one of Gelenbe (2006) that discusses intelligent 
networks. In this article, the author presents a vision of Intelligent Network in which users 
dynamically indicate their requests for services and formulate needs in terms of quality of 
service and price. The author examines the need to dynamically protect the networked system 
from denial of service (DoS) attacks and propose an approach to DoS defense which uses the 
detection of violations of QoS constraints and the automatic throttling or dropping of traffic 
to protect critical nodes.  
Molsa (2005) provides an interesting tutorial on DoS attacks, how they can be carried 
out in IP networks, and how one can defend against them. The author considers DDoS 
attacks as a subset of DoS attacks (p. 808). Before an attack is possible, a DoS program must 
first be deployed on one or more compromised hosts. The author argues that mitigation of 
DoS attacks requires thus defense mechanisms for both phases, though completely reliable 
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protection against DoS attacks is, however, not possible. There will always be vulnerable 
hosts in the Internet, and many attack mechanisms are based on ordinary use of protocols. 
Defense in depth is thus needed to mitigate the effect of DoS attacks. This paper describes 
shortly many defense mechanisms proposed in the literature. The goal is not to implement all 
possible defenses. Instead, one should optimize the trade-off between security costs and 
acquired benefits in handling the most important risks. Mitigation of DoS attacks is thus 
closely related to risk management. The author provides a list of known general reaction 
mechanisms (p. 825), defense mechanisms for the attack phases against flooding that include 
blocking, rate-limiting, connection tear-down, flood processing in another place, and IP 
hopping (p. 827).   
Robb (2005) focuses on different organizations applying a mix of technologies and 
procedures to protect the infrastructure from viruses, worm and DoS attacks. The authors 
argues that antivirus programs are usually client based and have scanning tools on E-mail 
they defend against viruses. In worm attacks, firewalls and intrusion prevention system (IPS) 
appliances are used in the network as well as on the endpoint. DoS attacks are something 
completely different; there it needs high availability networks. The Weather Channel 
Interactive in Atlanta has IPSs on the Internet border, intrusion detection systems that filter 
in-bound E-mail for viruses and malicious content, traditional packet-based firewalls and a 
product for filtering instant messaging (IM) traffic (p. 25). The ConSentry box is just one of a 
new class of devices which use algorithms to analyze traffic, rather than using signatures of 
viruses or worms (p. 26). 
According to Yocom (2004), IP-PBXs is the one, which supports 99 stations to offer 
many of the sophisticated features and endpoints available on higher-end products (p. 36). 
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Voice quality on these systems is good overall, although high latency was an issue on some 
of the softphones. Only Nortel BCM networks and interactive intelligence supported SIP 
phones and also includes firewall, virtual private networks (VPN), a DHCP server and router 
in one unit. So, the denial of service (DoS) attacks was implemented to determine what kind 
of attacks had got through a firewall or other security mechanisms and by incorporating 
management applications, ease of use, intuitiveness, real-time monitoring and reporting 
features are obtained and the installations process has easily achieved in this analysis. Thus 
powerful contact centers, service response, management and collaboration tools are the good 
reasons to consider IP-PBXs as a better bottom line (p. 42). The author argues that unless the 
buyers can see some clear return on investment (ROI) for buying into VoIP and feel secure in 
installing it, customer may be reluctant in replacing their old telephone systems. 
According to Narayanaswarny (2002) a denial of service (DOS) attack is any 
malicious attempt to deprive legitimate customers of their ability to access services, such as a 
Web server (p. 38). DOS attacks fall into two broad categories: server vulnerability attacks 
and packet flooding attacks. Many wonder why network security problems have seemingly 
increased suddenly in seriousness and importance. The main reason, according to the author, 
is the unanticipated growth and success of ISPs (p. 39). The rapid growth of affordable, high 
bandwidth connection technologies offered by various ISPs has brought in every imaginable 
type of customer to the fast Internet access arena: corporations, community colleges, small 
businesses, and the full gamut of home users (Narayanaswarny, p. 39). Unfortunately, people 
who upgrade their bandwidth do not necessarily upgrade their knowledge of network security 
at the same time; all they see is what they can accomplish with speed. Few foresee the 
potential security dangers until it is too late. As a result, the Internet has rapidly become a 
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high-speed network with depressingly low per-site security expertise. Such a network is 
almost an ideal platform to exploit in various ways, including the mounting of DOS attacks. 
Architecturally, ISPs are ideally situated to play a crucial role in containing the problem, 
although they have traditionally not been proactive on security matters (Narayanaswarny, p. 
39). The author of the article presents strategies on defending DDoS attacks that includes the 
following steps: ensure the integrity of the infrastructure, resist zombies in the infrastructure, 
implement appropriate router filters, disable facilities the customers may not need (pp. 40-
42). The author also emphasize the importance of assisting customers during DDoS attacks, 
assessment of DDoS technologies protection against outgoing and incoming DDoS attacks 
(pp. 42 – 45). 
Walters (2001) provides description of 10 ways to prevent denial of service attacks. 
Web site owners need to take specific steps to ensure their systems are protected from DoS 
(denial of service) and DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, which prevent legitimate 
users from accessing and using a site or particular service. In seeking to prevent DoS/DDoS 
attacks, every Web site has four areas of vulnerability: the gateway, the host, 
hardware/software, and personnel. The following recommendations address these four areas: 
(1) adopt a security policy and educate, educate, educate; (2) use multiple Internet service 
providers (ISPs); (3) practice good load balancing; (4) ensure redundancy (or “fall-over”) in 
all network devices, servers and power sources; (5) protect your critical systems with a 
hardened firewall; (6) auto-check your Web site; (7) keep the system simple; (8) stay current 
on upgrades, updates, vendor advisors and security bulletins; (9) stay vigilant through testing 
and monitoring; and (10) be ready to respond (pp. 71-72). 
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Neumann (2000) analyzed risks of DoS attacks relating to the Internet. He argues that 
DoS attacks are like computer viruses, there exits no present preventive solutions. Distributed 
DoS are still more difficult to detect, as they come from various sources, that too, when they 
use spoofed IP addresses. Some common security advices include, installing and properly 
configuring firewalls, demanding cryptographic authenticators rather than reusable fixed 
passwords etc. As this problem is desperately in need of technological and operational 
approaches, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and the organization National 
Infrastructure Protection Center are taking role in trying to track down attackers (p. 136). 
According to Hovav & D'Arcy (2003), the increase in security breaches in the last 
few years and the need to insure information assets has created an intensified interest in 
information risk within organizations and for insurance companies. Risk assessment is an 
important component in the establishment of security policies. However, very little is known 
of the financial impact and the risk associated with security breaches. The authors report the 
impact of Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack announcements on the market over a period of 4.5 
years. The study was conducted using event study methodology. The results show that in 
general the market does not penalize companies that experience such an attack. However, 
there is an indication that the market penalizes “Internet-specific” companies more than the 
companies that are not Internet-specific. The results indicate that large companies who are 
not “Internet-specific” might be overreacting to the media hype and may be investing 
resources to prevent a problem that has marginal impact on their shareholder value (p. 97). 
Methodology 
The methodology is based on analyzing the information provided by researchers on 
DoS/DDoS threats and countermeasures that can be effectively used in preventing such 
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attacks. I have chosen books and peer-reviewed article available in EBSCPO database. I also 
analyzed the information provided in electronic research papers of such well known company 
as Cisco which is the leader in networking as well as electronic research studies of Computer 
Emergency Response Team of Carnegie Mellon University. These sources were chosen since 
they provide reliable and peer-reviewed information that can be used in further analyses and 
studies. These resources will be analyzed and synthesized to provide answers to the research 
questions. This type of research is known as secondary research. The purpose of such 
research is to synthesize the knowledge obtained earlier to solve practical problem. As it was 
shown before, DoS/DDoS is problematic for many companies, and many of them need to 
develop business continuity and disaster recovery plans for protecting their business 
operations and transactions. To be able to do so, it is important to analyze, compare, and 
synthesize knowledge and best practices contained in the peer-reviewed resources about 
possible DoS/DDoS attacks and effective countermeasures. To achieve this goal I will study 
such resources by analyzing the malicious scenarios undertaken by attackers, 
countermeasures against such practices, and make suggestions on the best approaches in 
securing the company’s VoIP and networking environment, and, therefore, the company’s 
assets. 
Analysis of DoS and DDoS Attacks and Countermeasures 
In this chapter analysis of malicious scenarios of DoS and DDoS is provided and the 
best countermeasures and solutions are explored for securing VoIP environment. 
General Characteristics of DoS and DDoS Attacks 
DoS and DDoS attacks violate the availability goal of computer security. An online 
site is available if a person or program can gain access to the pages, data, or services 
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provided by the site when they are needed. Technologies such as load-balancing hardware 
and software can help ensure availability. In an ordinary network-based denial of service 
attack, an attacker uses a tool to send packets to the target system. These packets are 
designed to disable or overwhelm the target system, often forcing a reboot. Often, the source 
address of these packets is spoofed, making it difficult to locate the real source of the attack 
(Farrow, n.d.). 
In the DDoS attack, there might still be a single attacker, but the effect of the attack is 
greatly multiplied by the use of attack servers known as "agents". These agents are remotely 
controllable by the hacker. To get an idea of the scope of this attack, over 1,000 systems were 
used at different times in a concerted attack on a single server at the University of Minnesota. 
The attack not only disabled that server but denied access to a very large university network 
(Farrow, n.d.). 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks depend on getting the DDoS client to 
run on a wide range of computers. The usual trick is to package it as a ‘Trojan horse’, a 
secretly malicious program that unsuspecting people will run. Robichaux (n.d.) suggests that 
people should think twice before running executable programs or attachments that they got 
from unknown sources. Someone who's trying to build an arsenal of DDoS clients doesn't 
want to waste time sending Trojans to well-educated security professionals. It is better to 
send them to people who will run the malicious code without a second thought, especially if 
they aren't likely to notice that their machine is infected. 
Once a Trojan is activated, it registers its presence somewhere by sending TCP/IP 
packets to a well-known destination. These registration messages usually indicate the IP 
address of the zombied machine, and it may include some useful information about 
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bandwidth between the zombie and a selected target. Depending on the Trojan, it may 
attempt to disguise itself or stay hidden. The attacker can send a trigger command to one or 
all infected machines. The command instructs the Trojan to attack a designated target by 
sending a log of packets. The Trojan may also attempt to spread itself; many Trojans offer an 
attacker direct remote control of a compromised machine (Robichaux, n.d.). 
Once the DDoS attack has been launched, it's hard to stop. Packets arriving at 
firewalls may be blocked there, but they may just as easily overwhelm the incoming side of 
the Internet connection. If the source addresses of these packets have not been spoofed, one 
should try to find and then contact the responsible parties and ask them to stop the agents. If 
the addresses are spoofed, one will have no way of knowing if they reflect the true source of 
the attack until you track down some of the alleged sources (Farrow, n.d.). 
It is well known that an important goal for attackers is to hide the true sources of their 
attack traffic. One of the DoS attacks is called a distributed reflector denial of service attack, 
which aims to obscure the sources of attack traffic by using third parties to relay attack traffic 
to the victim. These innocent third parties are also called reflectors. Any machine that replies 
to an incoming packet can become a potential reflector. The DRDoS attack contains three 
stages. After the attacker has gained control of a certain number of “zombies,” instead of 
instructing the “zombies” to send attack traffic to the victims directly, the “zombies” are 
ordered to send to the third parties spoofed traffic with the victim’s IP address as the source 
IP address. DRDoS attacks have the ability to amplify the attack traffic, which makes the 
attack even more potent. In the following section, we use a real-world example to show the 
serious threat posed by DRDoS attacks (Peng, 2007, pp. 12-13). 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can affect any IP-based network service. The 
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impact of a DoS attack can range from mild service degradation to complete loss of 
service. There are several classes of DoS attacks. One type of attack in which packets 
can simply be flooded into or at the target network from multiple external sources is 
called a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. The DDoS attack can be 
represented using the following figure: 
 
Figure 1A Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack 
 
This figure shows that a network computer (e.g., a botnet) directs IP traffic at the 
interface of the firewall. Botnet are networks of software agents that often lie dormant until 
triggered to create harm, typically through DoS. The majority of malware has some botnet 
functions. That means that they allow for remote command and control via an obfuscated 
chain of authority. Botnets are not new, their use as an attack mechanism for DoS has been 
the biggest concern. Individual computers are initially infected by bot worms or super 
worms, each of which will connect back to an attacker when a new infection takes place. The 
attacker can use the infected computers to search out and infect other vulnerable hosts by 
exploiting vulnerabilities over the network or by sending virus attachment to random email 
recipients. The person who controls a large botnet is typically called a botherder. Law 
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enforcement agencies in different countries are starting to crack down on botherders, with 
some fairly high profile arrests. One such case is the arrest and prosecution of 21-year-old 
Christopher Maxwell, who controlled a botnet to launch DDoS attacks on the US Department 
of Defense, and California school district, and a Seattle hospital. As was noted by US 
Attorney’s Office, “The creation and use of botnets is a growing problem in cyberspace. In 
simple terms, a botnet is created when a computer hacker executes a program over the World 
Wide Web that seeks out computers with a security weakness it can exploit. The program 
will then infect the computer with malicious code so that it becomes essentially a robot drone 
for the hacker (also known as a “botherder”) controlling the botnet. The computer is ordered 
to connect to the communications channel where the botherder issues commands. Botnets 
can range in size from just a few computers to tens of thousands of computers doing the 
bidding of the botherder. (U.S. Attorney’s Office, 2006,) ” 
As it is suggested by Williams et al. (2006), organizations need to implement 
effective DoS prevention mechanisms, and in many cases, this can come from an upstream 
provider. The threat from botnets is not only from DoS conditions; organizations should 
implement malicious code prevention mechanisms that include anti-spyware, personal 
firewalls and host-based intrusion prevention to protect the end points from initial infection 
and use as part of a botnet (p. 24). 
The second large class of Denial of Service (DoS) conditions occurs when 
devices within the internal network are targeted by a flood of packets so that they fail 
taking out related parts of the infrastructure with them. Service disruption occurs to 
resource depletion-primarily bandwidth and CPU resource starvation. For example, 
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some IP telephones will stop working if they receive a UDP packet larger than 65534 
bytes on port 5060. 
The second class can be represented using the following picture (Porter, 2006, 
p. 243): 
 
Figure 2: An Internal Denial-of-Service Attack 
 
Neither integrity checks nor encryption can prevent these attacks. DoS or DDoS 
attacks are characterized simply by the volume of packets sent toward the victim 
computer; whether those packets are signed by a server, contain real or spoofed source 
IP addresses, or are encrypted with a fictitious key-none of these are relevant to the 
attack.  
DoS attacks are difficult to defend against, and because VoIP is just another IP 
network service, it is just as susceptible to DoS attack as any other IP network services. 
Additionally, DoS attacks are particularly effective against services such as VoIP and 
other real-time services, because these services are most sensitive to adverse network 
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status. Viruses and worms are included in this category as they often cause DoS or 
DDoS due to the increased network traffic that they generate as part of their efforts to 
replicate and propagate (Porter, 2006, p. 243).  
Consider first the internal DoS attack. The figure shows that VLAN 10 on the 
right is not affected by service disruption on the left in VLAN 2. By analyzing the 
Figure 2, we can see that this figure illustrated one critical weapon the security 
administrator has in thwarting DoS conditions – logical segregation of network domains 
in separate compartments. Each compartment can be configured to be relatively 
immune to the results of DoS in the others.  
Also, point solutions will be also effective in limiting the consequences of DoS 
conditions. For example, because strong authentication is seldom used in VoIP environ-
ments, the message processing components must trust and process messages from 
possible attackers. The additional processing of bogus messages exhausts server 
resources and leads to a DoS. SIP or H.323 Registration Flooding is an example of this. 
In that case, message processing servers can mitigate this specific threat by limiting the 
number of registrations it will accept per minute for a particular address (and/or from a 
specific IP address). An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) may be useful in fending off 
certain types of DoS attacks. These devices sit on the datapath and monitor passing 
traffic. When anomalous traffic is detected (either by matching against a database of 
attack signatures or by matching the results of an anomaly-detection algorithm) the IPS 
blocks the suspicious traffic. One problem with these devices-particularly in environ-
ments with high availability requirements-is that they sometimes block normal traffic, 
thus creating their own type of DoS.  
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Additionally, security administrators can minimize the chances of DoS by 
ensuring that IP telephones and servers are updated to the latest stable version and 
release. Typically, when a DoS warning is announced by bugtraq, the vendor quickly 
responds by fixing the offending software. Bugtraq is a mailing list hosted by Symantec 
SecurityFocus that serves as a vehicle for announcing new security vulnerabilities 
(SecurityFocus, 2007). 
VoIP endpoints can be infected with new VoIP device or protocol-specific viruses. 
WinCE, PalmOS, SymbianOS, and POSIX-based softphones are especially vulnerable 
because they typically do not run antivirus software and have less robust operating systems. 
Several Symbian worms already have been detected in the wild. Infected VolP devices then 
create a new "weak link" vector for attacking other network resources. Compromised devices 
can be used to launch attacks against other systems in the same network, particularly if the 
compromised device is trusted (i.e., inside the firewall). Malicious programs installed by an 
attacker on compromised devices can capture user input, capture traffic, and relay user data 
over a "back channel" to the attacker. This is especially worrisome for softphone users 
(Porter, 2006, p. 245).   
As was noted by Porter (2006), VoIP systems must meet stringent service 
availability requirements. He provides some example DoS threats can cause the VoIP 
service to be partially or entirely unavailable by preventing successful call placement 
(including emergency 911), disconnecting existing calls, or preventing use of related 
services like voicemail. Unfortunately this list is not but illustrates some attack 
scenarios.  
Following Porter (2006) and Endler & Collier (2007), we will analyze these 
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attacks and countermeasures that can be helpful in preventing most of these attacks. The 
following types of attacks will be analyzed: flooding attacks, network availability 
attacks, and supporting infrastructure attacks. 
Flooding Attacks 
One of the preferred types of bandwidth flooding attacks is User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) flooding because UDP source addresses can be easily spoofed by the attacker. 
Spoofing often allows an attacker the ability to manipulate trust relationships within an 
organization to bypass firewalls and other filter devices (for example, by crafting a DoS 
stream to appear as a DNS response over UDP port 53). Almost all SIP-capable devices 
support UDP, which makes it an effective choice of attack transport. Many VoIP devices and 
operating systems can be crippled if a raw UDP packet flood is aimed at the listening SIP 
port (5060) or even at random ports (Endler & Collier, 2007, p. 132). 
An attacker can perform control packet flood; in other words, an attacker can flood 
VoIP servers or endpoints with unauthenticated call control packets, (e.g., H.323 GRQ, 
RRQ, URQ packets sent to UDP/1719).The attacker's intent is to deplete/exhaust 
device, system, or network resources to the extent that VoIP service is unusable. Any 
open administrative and maintenance port on call processing and VoIP-related servers 
can be a target for this DoS attack (Porter, 2006, p. 246). 
The SYN flood attack exploits a vulnerability of the TCP three-way handshake, 
namely, that a server needs to allocate a large data structure for any incoming SYN packet 
regardless of its authenticity. During SYN flood attacks, the attacker sends SYN packets with 
source IP addresses that do not exist or are not in use. During the threeway handshake, when 
the server puts the request information into the memory stack, it will wait for the 
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confirmation from the client that sends the request. While the request is waiting to be 
confirmed, it will remain in the memory stack. Since the source IP addresses used in SYN 
flood attacks can be nonexistent, the server will not receive confirmation packets for requests 
created by the SYN flood attack. Each half-open connection will remain on the memory 
stack until it times out. More and more requests will accumulate and fill up the memory 
stack. Therefore, no new request, including legitimate requests, can be processed and the 
services of the system are disabled. Generally, the space for the memory stack allocated by 
the operating system is small, and even a small scale SYN flood attack can be disruptive. On 
the other hand, SYN floods can be also launched from compromised machines using genuine 
source IP addresses given these compromised machines are configured to ignore the 
SYN/ACK packets from the target (Peng, 2007, p 9). 
Another attack known as IP Phone Flood DoS occurs when an attacker sends a 
very large volume of call data toward a single VoIP endpoint to exhaust that device's 
CPU, bandwidth, TCP sessions, and so on. Interactive voice response systems, 
telephony gateways, conferencing servers, and voicemail systems are able to generate 
more call data than a single endpoint can handle and so could be leveraged to flood an 
endpoint. 
It is well known that the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is typically 
allowed through most firewalls and routers for diagnostic purposes (ping, traceroute, and so 
on). However, ICMP also provides the capability to send large amounts of ICMP traffic 
through the pipe as well. A more sinister use of ICMP traffic involves spoofing the source IP 
address and pinging broadcast addresses of a variety of networks that allow IP directed 
broadcasts (smurf attack). A smurf attack involves a flood of legitimate ICMP responses 
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from these networks to the victim who was spoofed. By overwhelming the victim's network 
bandwidth with spurious ICMP responses, most legitimate Internet applications will sputter 
under the attack (Endler & Collier, 2007, p. 133). As was noted by CERT (2000), “Both the 
intermediary and victim of this attack may suffer degraded network performance both on 
their internal networks or on their connection to the Internet. Performance may be degraded 
to the point that the network cannot be used. A significant enough stream of traffic can cause 
serious performance degradation for small and mid-level ISPs that supply service to the 
intermediaries or victims. Larger ISPs may see backbone degradation and peering 
saturation”. 
These types of floods are also known as application flooding attacks. An established 
connection flood is an evolution of the TCP SYN flood attack, but a full connection is made 
to the targeted service or device and then quickly torn down. This attack may go even further 
to make an actual application request to try to overwhelm the target. In the case of a target 
web server, this could take the form of thousands of botnet zombie hosts hammering away at 
a web server with legitimate GET requests. For a SIP PBX, it could take the form of 
thousands of REGISTER/INVITE /BYE requests received at the same time, overwhelming 
the incoming connection queue. Or conversely for a SIP client, this attack could take the 
form of thousands of bogus incoming calls rendering your phone useless (Endler & Collier, 
2007, p. 133). 
Another attack scenario is oversubscription which means the applications’ bandwidth 
have exceeded the network capabilities. This can occur from any number of flooding DoS 
attacks or poor QoS management. However, worm and virus outbreaks within the network 
can easily consume all available bandwidth as a side effect of scanning for other vulnerable 
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hosts to infect. Even just a few worm-infected machines within an organization can clog all 
available bandwidth with the spurious traffic spewing from the victims (Endler & Collier, 
2007, p. 133). 
Endler & Collier (2007) consider also a much more advanced type of flooding attack 
that involves subverting the quality of service mechanisms within a network in order to 
degrade VoIP applications. Assuming that an organization's QoS technologies are configured 
to prioritize RTP traffic over all other traffic, this normally means that a simple internal 
flooding attack would be mostly ineffective. However, if an attacker can flood a phone, 
proxy, or PBX with legitimate looking RTP traffic, the QoS mechanisms would be unable to 
determine which conversations are bogus and which ones are real and deserve network 
priority. Depending on the QoS mechanism being applied, it may also be necessary for the 
attacker to know two actively talking parties in order to spoof the proper ports and sequence 
numbers (p. 134). According to Porter (2006), an attacker can modify non-VoIP-specific 
protocol control information fields in VoIP data packets to and from endpoints to 
degrade or deny voice service. For example, if an attacker were to change 802.1Q 
VLAN tag or IP packet ToS bits, either as a man-in-the-middle or by compromising 
endpoint device configuration, the attacker could disrupt the quality of service 
"engineered" for a VoIP network. By subordinating voice traffic to data traffic, for 
example, the attacker might substantially delay delivery of voice packets (p. 246). 
Flooding Attack Countermeasures 
Endler & Collier (2007) mention a number of countermeasures that can be effective 
in preventing the flooding attacks. They advise that the company adopts a defense-in-depth 
approach to protecting its VoIP-dependent devices, network components, and servers (pp. 
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134 – 136). They suggest considering the following countermeasures: differentiated 
services, hardening the network perimeter, hardening VoIP phones and severs, and use 
of VLANs (Endler & Collier, 2007, pp. 134 - 136). 
The most common approach is called DiffServ for differentiated services. 
Network packets are tagged according to their priority based on the type of application 
they are. Network devices are then able to manage how they deliver and prioritize 
these incoming packets. The packet priorities can be tagged in a couple of ways. The 
differentiated services code point (DSCP) is applied at the IP layer. Equally as effective and 
more commonly used at the MAC layer are IEEE standards 802.1P and 802.1Q. 802.1P 
defines a scheme for prioritizing network traffic, and the 802.1Q (VLAN) header contains 
the 802.1P field, so VLANs are needed to implement QoS with 802.1P. 
Another solution would be considering a number of vendors that sell appliances that 
can be deployed at the perimeter as well as at the core of the network. These appliances are 
able to detect and either block or rate-limit an active DoS or DDoS attack.  
Hardening of the network perimeter is another approach. Much of the network 
equipment can be configured to resist the most basic DoS and DDoS techniques that 
attackers use. Cisco’s analysts suggest the following strategy to defend DoS and DDoS 
attacks (Cisco, 2007):  
1. Use the ip_verify_unicast_reverse_path interface command on the input 
interface on the router at the upstream end of the connection. This feature 
examines each packet received as input on that interface. If the source IP 
address does not have a route in the CEF tables that points back to the same 
interface on which the packet arrived, the router drops the packet. 
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2. Filter all RFC-1918 address space using Access Control Lists (ACLs).  
3. Apply ingress and egress filtering using ACLs.  
4. Use CAR to rate limit ICMP packets.  
5. Configure rate limiting for SYN packets.  
Endler & Collier (2007) suggest also hardening VoIP phones and servers; this 
approach includes some basic recommendations regardless of the particular vendor: the 
suggest changeing the default passwords and remove all guest and nonauthenticated 
accounts, disabling unnecessary services (telnet, HTTP, and so on), ensuring the device or 
operation system is up-to-date with the latest patches and/ or firmware, and developing a 
strategy for keeping up-to-date with patches (p. 136).  
Finally, Virtual LANs (VLANs) can be used to segment network domains logically 
on the same physical switch. Many switches support the ability to create several VLANs on 
the same switch, which is a helpful component for protecting the core VoIP servers and 
devices against the typical DoS traffic threats that plague most traditional data networks, 
such as worm and viruses. Endler & Collier (2007) argue that it is not feasible to segment the 
entire VoIP infrastructure from the traditional data network, in part because of many shared 
dependencies on the underlying infrastructure such as DNS, DHCP, IFTP. Softphone VoIP 
applications that run on a user's desktop also make it challenging to separate your VoIP 
applications logically from the data network because a user's desktop typically needs to able 
to reach most of the network resources on the traditional data network (p. 136). 
Network Availability Attacks and Countermeasures. 
Another class of network DoS attacks are network availability attacks. These attacks 
involve an attacker trying to crash the targeted network device or underlying operating 
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system. Such attacks include stress testing with malformed packets (fuzzing), packet 
fragmentation leveraging vulnerabilities in the underlying application or operating system. 
Consider each of them and countermeasures that can be used in preventing and defending 
such attacks. 
The TCP/IP stack implementations in different versions of Windows are unique 
enough that they can be differentiated in their responses to network traffic. The point is that 
all vendors implement their device IP stacks in various ways, in some cases varied across 
different versions of the same product. Some implementations are more robust than others 
and are able to handle a variety of error conditions. Most of the time developers don't take 
into account network input that deviates from "normal" traffic, which in some cases can lead 
to the device or application crashing upon processing it. To adequately test the robustness of 
a network stack implementation, it is useful to devise as many ‘evil’ test cases as possible 
that poke the bound of the support protocol. Bugs and DoS vulnerabilities can be found by 
crafting different types of packets for that protocol, containing data that pushes the protocol's 
specifications to the breaking point, otherwise known as fuzzing (Endler & Collier, 2007, pp. 
136-137). One of the fuzzing tools is IP Stack Integrity Checker (ISIC). It is a suite of 
utilities to exercise the stability of an IP Stack and its component stacks (TCP, UDP, ICMP 
et. al.) It generates piles of pseudo random packets of the target protocol. The packets are 
then sent against the target machine to either penetrate its firewall rules or find bugs in the IP 
stack. ISIC also contains a utility generate raw ether frames to examine hardware 
implementations (PacketFactory, 2006). 
Another way of attacking the networks is packet fragmentation. By fragmenting TCP 
and UDP packets in unique ways, it is possible to render useless many operating systems and 
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VoIP devices through resource consumption. There are many variations of fragmentation 
attacks; some of the most popular exploits include teardrop, opentear, nestea, jolt, boink, etc 
(Endler & Collier, 2007, p. 137). One of the examples of well-known fragmentation based 
vulnerabilities is ISS RealSecure 3.2.x Fragmented SYN Packets DoS Vulnerability. ISS 
RealSecure 3.2.x can be disabled remotely via fragmented packets with the SYN flag set. On 
NT, after crashing the service will restart, and generates an Application Log event. If the 
packets are continuously resent, detection is effectively halted while the service repeatedly 
restarts. On Solaris, the process crashes, all detection stops, and a report is generated to the 
console. Also, on Solaris it is possible to crash the process with a flood of unfragmented 
packets if certain flags (in addition to SYN) are set (SecurityFocus, 2007). 
The other major category of DoS attacks on VoIP infrastructure involves an attacker 
leveraging vulnerabilities in the underlying application or operating system, which can lead 
to a system crash or overwhelming resource consumption. One of the examples of such 
attacks is a malicious self-replicating program known as the "Code Red" worm. It is targeted 
at systems running the Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS). Several Cisco products 
are installed or provided on targeted systems. Additionally, the behavior of the worm can 
cause problems for other network devices. According to Cisco (2001), the following Cisco 
products are vulnerable because they run affected versions of Microsoft IIS: Cisco 
CallManager, Cisco Unity Server, Cisco uOne etc. 
What kind of countermeasures can be suggested for preventing of network 
availability attacks? First of all, all the countermeasures listed in before can be applied here 
as well as to ensure network availability. Additional to these measures one more 
countermeasure can be added here – Network based Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS). 
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NIPS monitor and anlyze network traffic to detect intrusion. NIPS have a management 
interface that can configure rules. NIPS throws alarms when encountering suspicious 
activities. Optionally NIPS can be configured to perform actions such as resetting data 
connections, instructing router to deny future traffic from an offending host, and so on 
(Davidson et al. 2007, p. 233). NIPS also buy IT admins time to patch enterprise-wide by 
providing a sort of virtual patch for any exploits that may emerge soon after a new 
vulnerability is discovered in the public domain (Endler & Collier, 2007, p. 139).  
Supporting Infrastructure Attacks and Countermeasures 
An infrastructure attack aims to disable the services of critical components of the 
Internet. The result of an infrastructure attack is potentially catastrophic as the whole Internet 
can be affected (Peng, 2007, p. 14). Basic VoIP architecture elements such as phones, 
servers, and PBXs rely heavily on the supporting network infrastructure (DHCP, DNS, 
TFTP). If one of those support elements is attacked or taken offline, a side effect may be that 
VoIP applications are crippled or severely limited in usability. Many VoIP phones are 
configured, by default, to request an IP address dynamically every time they are turned on or 
rebooted. If the DHCP server is unavailable at the time they boot up, or the maximum 
number of IP addresses have already been allocated by that DHCP server, then the phone 
might not be usable on the network. DHCP is a broadcast protocol which means that 
REQUEST messages from DHCP clients such as IF phones are seen by all devices on the 
local network, but are not forwarded to additional subnetworks. If the DHCP server is present 
on a different network, DHCP forwarding must be enabled on the router. DHCP forwarding 
converts the broadcast message into a unicast message and then forwards the message to the 
configured DHCP server. DHCP forwarding is offered on most routers and layer 3 switches 
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(Endler & Collier, 2007, pp. 141-142).  
There are some DHCP exhaustion countermeasures. DHCP servers can be configured 
so that not to lease addresses to unknown MAC addresses and also to untrusted network 
segments. According to Cisco (n. d.), DHCP snooping is a DHCP security feature that 
provides security by filtering untrusted DHCP messages and by building and maintaining a 
DHCP snooping binding table. An untrusted message is a message that is received from 
outside the network or firewall and that can cause traffic attacks within your network. The 
DHCP snooping binding table contains the MAC address, IP address, lease time, binding 
type, VLAN number, and interface information that corresponds to the local untrusted 
interfaces of a switch; it does not contain information regarding hosts interconnected with a 
trusted interface. An untrusted interface is an interface that is configured to receive messages 
from outside the network or firewall. A trusted interface is an interface that is configured to 
receive only messages from within the network. DHCP snooping acts like a firewall between 
untrusted hosts and DHCP servers. It also gives you a way to differentiate between untrusted 
interfaces connected to the end-user and trusted interfaces connected to the DHCP server or 
another switch (p. 1).  
DNS cache poisoning attacks involve an attacker tricking a DNS server into believing 
the veracity of a fake DNS response. The purpose of this type of attack is to redirect the 
victims dependent on that DNS server to other addresses; this type of attack has traditionally 
been used in phishing schemes to redirect a user trying to surf to their banking site to a fake 
site owned by the hacker. A DNS SRV record assists SIP phone dialing in much the same 
way that MX records help map email addresses to the appropriate mail servers. Some sites 
are beginning to use DNS SRV records to forward certain SIP requests to particular proxy 
216______________________________________________________________ iJAMT 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
The International Journal of Applied Management and Technology, Vol 6, Num 1 
addresses, potentially outside of the organization. This has particularly dangerous 
implications if an attacker can poison these resource listings to redirect all calls going to your 
domain to her external proxy (Porter, 2006, p. 249; Endler & Collier, 2007, pp. 146-147).  
According to Householder et al. (2002), name servers exposed to the Internet are 
subject to a wide variety of attacks (p. 1): 
• attacks against the name server software may allow an intruder to compromise 
the server and take control of the host. This often leads to further compromise 
of the network; 
• denial of service attacks, even one directed at a single DNS server, may affect 
an entire network by preventing users from translating hostnames into the 
necessary IP addresses; 
• spoofing attacks that try to induce your name server to cache false resource 
records, and could lead unsuspecting users to unsavory sites;  
• information leakage from a seemingly innocent zone transfer could expose 
internal network topology information that can be used to plan further attacks; 
• a name server could even be an unwitting participant in attacks on other sites. 
DNS cache poisoning is almost entirely avoidable by configuring the DNS server 
properly. This includes forcing it to scrutinize any forwarded DNS response information 
passed by other non-authoritative servers and dropping any DNS response records passed 
back that do not relate to the original query. Most recent DNS servers are immune to this 
attack in their default configurations (Householder et al., 2002, pp. 2-5; Peng et al., p. 13).  
Summary, Conclusions, Recommendation 
As we saw in the Chapter 4, DoS and DDoS attacks are the most difficult VoIP 
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related threats to defend against. There are a plethora of different types of DoS and DDoS 
attacks that can cripple the company’s VoIP environment. Not only the company needs to 
protect its VoIP devices and services; it needs to protect data network and supporting 
infrastructure. 
There are a number of scenarios that can be vulnerable, can damage the whole 
computer system of a company and thereby interrupt business process of the company. 
The packet switching nature of data networks allows multiple connections to share the 
same transport medium. That means that unlike telephones in circuit-switched 
networks, an IP terminal endpoint can receive and potentially participate in multiple 
calls at once. An endpoint can be used to amplify attacks. 
We considered and analyzed the following types of attacks: flooding attacks, 
network availability attacks, and supporting infrastructure attacks. For each type of 
attacks there are countermeasures. It is important to know what countermeasures are 
good and in which situations. This can help develop business continuity plan as well as 
disaster recovery plan that can help not only to fix the problem, but also prevent most of 
them. The chapter should have practical implications for the company, although it is not 
possible to deploy security technologies to counter every possible threat. The 
company’s networking analysts should be able to identify most of the threats the 
company can experience, assess the security risks that are specific to the company’s 
network and address the highest priority risks first. That means not all DoS/DDoS 
attack should be considered, but those that are very risky for the company.  
What is the practical benefit of conducted research? The practical benefit is that 
the analysts of the company should design and document risk assessment, an 
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operational plan, outlining critical DoS attacks, in order of priority. This document 
should guide the security technologies that are deployed and prioritize future 
implementations. The operational plan should also include and incident response plan 
outlining specific initial steps to take in case of a security breach. The plan should 
document internal policies such as password policies, access control, monitoring 
strategies, and be communicated to the key people who will be implementing, 
enforcing, or resolving these security issues.  
As one of the practical recommendations that can be made is efficient allocation 
of the resources such as bandwidth to accommodate the maximum number of callers. 
This property can be violated by attackers who aggressively and abusively obtain an 
unnecessarily large amount of resources. Alternatively, the attacker simply can flood 
the network with large number of packets so that resources are unavailable to all other 
callers.  
In addition, viruses and worms create DoS conditions due to the network traffic 
generated by these agents as they replicate and seek out other hosts to infect. These 
agents are proven to wreak havoc with even relatively well-secured data networks. 
VoIP networks, by their nature, are exquisitely sensitive to these types of attacks.  
Remedies for DoS can be the following: include logical network partitioning at 
layers 2 and 3, stateful firewalls with application inspection capabilities, policy 
enforcement to limit flooded packets, and out-of-band management. Out-of-band 
management is required so that in the event of a DoS event, system administrators are 
still able to monitor the network and respond to additional events.  
Security is an important consideration in designing and implementing VoIP 
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services. It encompasses almost every aspect of a network from Layer 2 devices to 
firewalls and Certificate Authorities. As we saw, a wide range of security technology 
exist that can be helpful for a company to protect, prevent and defend its VoIP 
environment. Assessing DoS, can help generate new knowledge and develop a 
knowledge base for a company to make better decision in securing its VoIP 
environment. 
Strong security for any VoIP applications requires companies to analyze the security 
readiness of any application, networking device, critical infrastructure and end-user devise. 
Companies should test security infrastructure to make sure the company is protected. On the 
other side, companies can implement statistical or mathematical models to estimate how 
risky the attacks are.  
For example, propagation of worms can be modeled well with the epidemic model 
describing the spread of infectious diseases. Epidemic model gives the average infection rate 
in a population where the infected individuals contact uninfected individuals with the average 
contact rate (Molsa, 2005, p. 810). The parameters can be estimated or calibrated given 
historical data, and can be used for practical estimations. 
The analysis of the threats described above can help in developing, improving and 
refining risk assessment matrix. It is possible to create matrix of probabilities of asset/risks 
based on the available data or from approximate estimation. In this case various types of 
DoS/DDoS can be considered, and probabilities can be chosen based on statistical analysis of 
attacks data. Modeling can help investigate ‘what-if’ scenarios of possible DoS/DDoS attacks 
and how countermeasures would work to prevent them. The model can indicate if specific 
countermeasure is effective or not. 
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The first step would be to develop a model, and use it in calibrating of the model 
parameters. To calibrate the model parameters, it is important to conduct statistical analysis. 
Unfortunately, not all data can be available, but some assumptions can be made about 
distribution of the malicious DoS/DDoS attacks. This distribution can be used in simulation 
of possible attacks and testing how the company could respond to such attacks. Testing could 
help to analyze existing business continuity and disaster recovery plans that can then be 
improved based on the results of testing. Of course, it would be great if there is statistical 
data available. Additional research may be required for better estimation of probabilities. 
Another approach is to assume, for example, that DoS/DDoS attacks are occurring 
according to the Poisson process. Statistical methods can help estimate the intensity of the 
process for running Monte Carlo simulation and assessing possible losses the company can 
experience. The result of such simulations will be a loss distribution of the company from the 
attacks VoIP and networking environment. Loss distributions can be estimated for each type 
of DoS as well for all types for specific time period. 
Another problem is to estimate correlation different types of DoS and DDoS attacks. 
Statistical methods can help in estimation of the correlations. These correlations can be 
useful in estimation of the total loss distribution of the company. Correlation and loss 
distribution usually change over time, and it can incur additional problems in estimation of 
losses. Although methodology can be difficult to implement, it can be valuable for the 
company to estimate possible losses due to DoS/DDoS attacks that can affect the company’s 
business and its operations. 
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